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Introduction 
The African Union (AU) neither intends to manage, nor would be capable of managing, the 
entire continent’s armed conflicts or other problems. Hence, the African security architecture 
developed by the AU envisages a considerable outsourcing of responsibilities to the various 
sub-regional organisations, usually referred to as the RECs (the regional economic 
communities). The formula for this is ‘subsidiarity’, the pros and cons of which are discussed 
in the following section (Møller 2005). There is certainly much to be said for such 
decentralisation, but there are also complications, as it is far from clear that all these 
organisations are up to the task.  
 
One constraint may be the lack of leadership as only a few of them have any member able to 
play the role of hegemon, combining strength with legitimacy in the eyes of the other 
members – the latter also a reflection of the absence of values and norms shared by 
everybody. Not only are most of the RECs not harmonious communities, but in quite a few of 
them, members actually fight against each other, either in the form of international wars or, 
more frequently, proxy wars. In the world of real architecture, buildings would simply be torn 
down and new ones, more suitable to the purpose, constructed in their place, but in the world 
of international politics there is a strong tendency to make the best of existing organisations. 
The bulk of this paper is devoted to a concrete analysis of the main RECs covering Africa’s 
five sub-regions: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Arab 
Maghreb Union (AMU).  
 
The emerging picture is, alas, not really one of a seamless web of strong organisations, but 
rather a patchwork of sub-regional organisations of varying strength and with quite a few 
gaping holes, in the sense of organisational weakness where it is most needed. As a 
consequence, the AU may be relieved from some of its responsibilities, but it will most likely 
still be forced to take action in quite a few contingencies, at least for the foreseeable future.   
  
Subsidiarity, Hegemony and Architecture 
The origins of the principle of subsidiarity go way back in history where it was initially 
intended as a guideline for national politics, but it has also been applied to the international 
level, for example as a guiding principle for the division of responsibility and authority 
between the European Union and its member states (Henkel 2002). It is also implicitly 
enshrined in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, which assigns important roles to ‘regional 
arrangements’ as instances of first resort as far as the peaceful resolution of conflicts is 
concerned (Sidhu 2007; Møller 2008a).  
We can thus construct a hierarchical order with global organisations, individual states at the 
bottom, and regional and sub-regional organisations occupying middle rungs (Table 1), 
showing both how responsibility is shifted and authority delegated downwards.  
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Table 1: Subsidiarity 
 
 Mode Level Mod
e 
Actor When? 
3rd 
Intl. 
Resort 
 
Global 
UN ? ‘When all else fails’ 
? Use of force required 
2nd  
Intl. 
Resort 
 
Regional 
AU ? No REC available 
? REC insufficient 
 
1st  
Intl. 
Resort 
 
 
Sub-regional 
 
RECs (AMU, 
ECOWAS, IGAD, 
ECCAS, SADC) 
? States unable to 
resolve their 
differences 
? Intra-state problems 
not solvable at 
national level 
Intl. 
Resort 
Zero 
 
National 
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between states 
 
1st  
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e 
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n 
 Local authorities 
The actors 
themselves 
? ‘Normal 
circumstances’ 
 
For all its merits, there are also drawbacks to subsidiarity. The closer states are geographically 
to a conflict, the less they may be able to remain impartial and the more this may incapacitate 
the organisation to which they belong. Moreover, there seems to be a rather strong correlation 
between the efficiency of an organisation and the presence of a hegemonic power among its 
members; but unfortunately a hegemon also tends to be even more involved in the sub-
region’s conflicts than other members.    
 
 The AU pays tribute to the subsidiarity principle ‘upwards’ by acknowledging the supreme 
authority of the UN Security Council, but ‘downwards’ there are no references to the sub-
regional organisations as instances of first (international) resort. Rather they tend to be 
referred to as ‘implementing organs’. AU documents abound with terms such as partnership, 
consultation, harmonisation and co-operation, but are vague with regard to divisions of labour 
and responsibilities. More concrete plans have, however, been developed with regard to the 
African Stand-By Force, entailing the fielding of five regional on-call units as well as a 
standing brigade at the AU level (African Military Experts 2003). The plans for their use 
follow the subsidiarity principles quite closely, as they are envisioned to undertake the less 
time-critical missions whereas the AU brigade is envisioned to be tasked with both swift 
deployment to intervene in an emergency and with filling possible gaps at the sub-regional 
level. 
 
In 1976, the Organisation of African Unity stipulated that there are five regions in Africa, 
without specifying which states were to belong to which sub-region. This matter seems at 
long last to have been resolved, but unfortunately the existing RECs do not quite correspond 
to the sub-regions and their memberships overlap (see Appendices 1 and 2). 
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Even though both COMESA and CEN-SAD are sometimes also counted as RECs (AUC 
2004), the most relevant as well as those which most closely correspond to the five sub-
regions are the AMU in North Africa (but excluding Egypt and including Morocco, which is 
not an AU member); ECOWAS in West Africa; IGAD in Northeast Africa; ECCAS in 
Central Africa; and SADC in Southern Africa. In the following sections we shall provide a 
brief historical narrative of all five, an outline of their organisational structure and a tentative 
analysis of their peace and security-related ambitions and activities.   
 
Based on the assumption of international relations ‘realists’ that power matters and that 
hegemony may promote (or even be a precondition of) regional collaboration, statistics are 
provided for at least some of those ‘aggregate capabilities’ on which, according to Kenneth 
Waltz (1979: 131), power is based. However, even though hegemony may be based on power, 
it also requires the ability to persuade the other members that the hegemon’s wishes 
correspond to the common interests, which presupposes a certain commonality of values 
(Møller 2009a).  
   
West Africa: ECOWAS 
ECOWAS was established as a vehicle for economic collaboration, but has largely failed in 
this, as have most other African initiatives (Adebajo 2004). However, the organisation has 
gradually become rather deeply involved in conflict management, and with some success 
(Adebajo 2002: 23-42; Adibe 2000; Aboagye 2004; Berman 2000: 75-149).  
 
One explanation may be that it unites nations facing common challenges and problems 
‘spilling over’ from one country to its neighbours, and thus crying out for multilateral 
solutions, such as organised crime and small arms proliferation. What also ties the region 
together is the presence of an obvious hegemon, namely Nigeria, which surpasses all other 
members in most respects (Table 2). 
 
Table 2: The Basis of Hegemony in ECOWAS 
Source: CIA 2008; IISS 2009: 451-452. 
 
Territory GDP 
Military 
Expenditure Troops 
Parameter 
State 
sq.kms. 
Population 
US$bill ppp. US$mil. Thousands 
Benin 112,620 8,791,832 13.150 55 5 
Burkina Faso 274,200 15,746,232 19.340 95 11 
Cape Verde 4,033 429,474 1.808 8 1 
Cote d'Ivoire 322,460 20,617,068 33.780 290 17 
Gambia 11,300 1,782,893 2.044 4 1 
Ghana 239,460 23,832,495 34.520 104 14 
Guinea 245,857 10,057,975 11.070 52 12 
Guinea-Bissau 36,120 1,533,964 0.904 15 6 
Liberia 111,370 3,441,790 1.741 na na 
Mali 1,240,000 12,666,987 14.980 157 7 
Niger 1,267,000 15,306,252 9.657 46 5 
Nigeria 923,768 149,229,090 328.100 980 80 
Senegal 196,190 13,711,597 22.980 193 14 
Sierra Leone 71,740 6,440,053 4.418 29 11 
Togo 56,785 6,019,877 5.428 42 9 
Total 5,112,903 289,607,579 503.920 2070 193 
Nigeria share 18% 52% 65% 47% 41% 
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History and Structure 
ECOWAS was founded in 1975 and its membership has remained stable since then, the only 
exception being Mauritania, which left the organisation in 2000 (Africa Research 2000). The 
founding Treaty of Lagos was exclusively devoted to economic and social integration and did 
not even mention peace and security issues, but in 1978 ECOWAS adopted a ‘Protocol on 
Non-Aggression’, followed in 1981 by a ‘Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance in Defence’. 
It was also decided to establish a Defence Council and a Defence Commission, as well as to 
earmark units from the national armed forces to participate in multilateral forces. 
Nevertheless, virtually nothing came of this, just as the non-aggression pact was violated on 
several occasions, for example during the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone.  
 
By the time these two challenges appeared, ECOWAS was readying itself to play a security 
role, but was still far from ready, necessitating improvisation. Partly drawing on the lessons of 
these two armed conflicts, the Lagos Treaty was amended in 1993, and the new Treaty of 
ECOWAS included several innovative measures in the field of peace and security. The 
preamble thus envisioned a ‘partial and gradual pooling of national sovereignties to the 
Community’, and member states committed themselves to strengthen existing mechanisms 
and to establish ‘a regional peace and security observation system and peace-keeping forces 
where appropriate’ (ECOWAS 1993).  
 
ECOWAS now has a fairly elaborate organisational structure (Figure 1). The main bodies are 
the Authority, consisting of the Heads of States and Government, a Council of Ministers, a 
Community Parliament, an Economic and Social Council, a Community Court of Justice 
(Ajulo 2001), a Commission (formerly Secretariat) and a Fund for Cooperation, 
Compensation and Development.  
 
In 1999, a ‘Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, 
Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security’ was adopted (Adibe 2000: 157-165; Adebajo 2002: 
137-163; Berman and Sams 2000: 138-145; Abass 2000). Besides the Authority and the 
Secretariat, it involves a Mediation and Security Council (MSC), in which decisions are taken 
by a two-thirds majority of states. The MSC is mandated to authorise all forms of intervention 
and decide on the deployment of political and military missions. Under the auspices of the 
MSC a number of organs were further established, including: 
• A Defence and Security Commission, consisting of chiefs of staff, officers 
responsible for internal affairs and security and civil servants from the foreign 
offices; 
• A Council of Elders, consisting of ‘eminent personalities’ envisaged to serve 
as ‘mediators, conciliators and facilitators’; 
• ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), comprising armed 
forces as well as civilian personnel charged with observation and monitoring, 
peace keeping and restoration of peace, humanitarian intervention, 
enforcement of sanctions, preventive deployment, peace-building, 
disarmament and demobilisation and policing activities; 
• An early warning system consisting of an Observation and Monitoring Centre 
in charge of data collection and analyses, and four observation and monitoring 
zones. 
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Figure 1: ECOWAS Organigram (simplified) 
 
CFACDS: COM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, COOPERATION, DEFENCE AND SECURITY; CM: COUNCIL OF MINISTERS; 
DEM & GOOD GOV.: DEMOCRACY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE; ECOMOG: ECOWAS CEASEFIRE MONITORING 
GROUP; ECOSAP: ECOWAS SMALL ARMS PROGRAMME; EWOMC: EARLY WARNING/OBSERVATION 
MONITORING CENTRE; MPM: MISSION PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT; MSC: MEDIATION AND SECURITY 
COUNCIL; PAPS: POLITICAL AFFAIRS, PEACE AND SECURITY; PK & REG. SEC.: PEACEKEEPING AND REGIONAL 
SECURITY; SAU: SMALL ARMS UNIT; ZB: ZONAL BUREAU 
  
The protocol further envisaged ‘a graduated strategy for building peace’, including such 
missions as supervision of elections and general support for the development of democratic 
institutions, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes, also for child 
soldiers and measures to control the flow of small arms. Considerable effort has gone into the 
latter problem – e.g. producing a ‘Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and 
Manufacture of Light Weapons’ signed in 1998, followed in 2006 by a ‘Convention on Small 
Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials’, which has yet to 
enter into force (Murray 2000; Bah 2004).  
 
In 2001, an supplementary protocol was adopted, dealing with democracy and good 
governance, establishing a set of mandatory constitutional principles, including separation of 
powers, free and fair multi-party elections and a ‘zero tolerance for power obtained or 
maintained by unconstitutional means’. Provisions were made for election monitoring, and 
sanctions such as suspension from decision making within the organisation were foreseen for 
violation of these norms. That this is not mere talk was demonstrated when the organisation 
imposed diplomatic sanctions on the new government in Togo, regarded as usurpers because 
the military had, upon the death of the dictator, Gnassingbe Eyadema, manipulated his son 
into power (Banjo 2008).   
 
Authority 
Commission CM 
PAPS 
Political Affairs  
Comm. of Amb. 
Parliament Court of Justice 
CFACDS  
EWOMC 
PK & Reg.Sec. 
ZB  Banjul ZB Cotonou ZB Ougadougou ZB Monrovia 
Security Peacekeeping Small Arms MPM 
Dem. & Good Gov. Electoral Assistance
Human Rights 
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Council of Elders 
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Peacekeeping Operations and/or Humanitarian Interventions 
ECOWAS has also launched military operations, generally labelled ‘peacekeeping’, even 
though ‘humanitarian interventions’ may be a more appropriate term.   
 
The first was to Liberia, where a chaotic civil was created by the insurgency of Charles 
Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) in 1989. Following the signing of a 
ceasefire with which none of the warring parties complied, and in the conspicuous absence of 
any UN attempts to solve the crisis, ECOWAS stepped into the breach with a hastily 
assembled, and predominantly Nigerian, regional peacekeeping force. Euphemistically 
labelled ‘ECOWAS Monitoring Group’, ECOMOG was deployed to Liberia in 1990. It was a 
mixed success, as the peacekeepers even failed to protect the life of the deposed president, 
Samuel Doe (Alao et al. 1999; Howe 1996; Cleaver and May 1998). It was finally withdrawn 
in 1998 after the rather surprising election of Charles Taylor as president of the country he 
had ravaged so mercilessly (Harris 1999), and it played only a very insignificant role when 
the next round of the civil war broke out towards the end of the millennium.  
 
Next came a deployment to Sierra Leone, where a rebellion had been launched by the 
Revolutionary United Front, supported by Taylor’s NPFL (Keen 2005; Richards 1998; Gberi 
2005). Following several failed mediation attempts and a haphazard deployment of national 
armed forces of several member states, in 1997 ECOWAS decided to deploy ‘ECOMOG II’ 
to Sierra Leone, partly by ‘rehatting’ forces already there (Adebajo 2002: 79-109; Mortimer 
2000; Berman and Sams 2000: 111-128; Adibe 2000: 125-133, 145-153). They managed to 
reinstate the deposed president Kabbah, even though most of this was in fact a unilateral 
Nigerian operation. The situation was further complicated by the overlap between the 
ECOMOG/Nigerian mission and a small and ineffective UN mission (UNOMSIL), followed 
by a unilateral British intervention (Fowler 2004). Following the election of Obasanjo as 
president of Nigeria, it began a phased withdrawal that forced the UN to deploy a genuine 
peacekeeping mission (UNAMSIL) to Sierra Leone (Findlay 2002; Ofuatey-Kodjoe 2003). 
Even this force, however, needed reinforcement by 3,000 Nigerian troops.  
 
Both deployments were arguably reasonably successful and the performance of the 
ECOMOG forces largely satisfactory, albeit far from flawless (Adebajo 2008b). Moreover, its 
services came cheap. Whereas the per capita troop costs of the UN’s forces in Liberia were 
$500,000, those of ECOMOG were a mere $30,406 (Adibe 2000: 145). Perhaps even more 
importantly, ECOMOG forces have proven to be far less casualty-scared than, say, those of 
the Western powers, with the total Nigerian casualty toll estimated at nearly one thousand 
(Adebajo 2002: 141).   
 
The third ECOWAS intervention took place in Guinea-Bissau where an armed conflict broke 
out in 1998-1999.  The first regional response was a joint intervention by Senegal and Guinea 
without ECOWAS endorsement, followed by ECOWAS mediation efforts undertaken in 
collaboration with the CPLP (Communidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa) (MacQueen 
2003) leading to the deployment of a small and inefficient peacekeeping force, which ended 
in failure. According to Adekeye Adebajo (2002: 112), this failure was partly due to the 
absence of Nigeria: ‘Lacking the regional Gulliver, the Lilliputian peacekeepers had to 
withdraw from Bissau by June 1999’ (see also Adibe 2000: 133-136, 153-157; Berman and 
Sams 2000: 128-138). 
 
The fourth test of the organisation came when a civil war broke out in Côte d’Ivoire, which 
had previously been an anchor of stability in the region. ECOWAS quickly became involved. 
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Following the signing of the so-called Marcoussis Accords, in 2003 ECOWAS deployed a 
ceasefire-monitoring operation, the 1,400-stong MICECI/ECOMICI (Mission de la CEDEAO 
en Côte d’Ivoire/ECOWAS Mission to Côte d’Ivoire) to supplement a very small UN 
mission. The ECOWAS troop contributors were Benin, Ghana, Niger, Senegal and Togo, but 
significantly not Nigeria. An element in this was a rather bizarre military operation,  
conducted jointly with French forces, the government armed forces and those of the former 
rebels in pursuit of rogue elements and (mainly Liberian) mercenaries – all with a ‘Chapter 
VII mandate’ from the UN Security Council. Only in February 2004 was the UN mission 
expanded to a regular peacekeeping mission under which the ECOWAS forces were then 
subsumed (ICG 2003). 
 
Conclusion: Nigeria’s Central Role 
The greatest weakness of ECOWAS may be its critical dependency on the contribution of 
Nigeria, both in military and other terms (Saliu 2000). The deployments have all placed 
severe strains on the capacity of the smaller member states, and there is little reason to expect 
this to change. Fortunately for regional collaboration, however, Nigerian foreign policy seems 
remarkably stable, so any major changes in its orientation seem unlikely, even though they 
cannot be ruled out (Obi 2008; Adebajo 2008a). The hegemonic position of Nigeria also 
means that ECOWAS will be unable to do much about a significant share of the region’s 
conflicts, namely those situated ‘in the belly of the beast’ itself – e.g. the Muslim versus 
Christian unrest in northern Nigeria or the insurgencies in the southern parts of the country, 
not to mention the possibility of yet another coup by the Nigerian military.   
 
Southern Africa: SADC 
To almost the same extent as ECOWAS, the Southern African REC, SADC, exhibits a 
distribution of strengths that should be conducive to hegemony, with South Africa cast in the 
role as hegemon (Legum 2000) (Table 3). However, the establishment of actual hegemony 
has been blocked by the presence of rivals of comparable strength (at least in certain 
dimensions), such as Angola and Zimbabwe, and the widespread lack of trust in South Africa, 
widely perceived as economically dominant and regarded as inherently expansionist (Hudson 
2007; Schoeman 2007; Alden and Soko 2005).  
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Table 3: The Basis of Hegemony in SADC 
Source: CIA 2008; IISS 2009: 451-452. 
 
Territory GDP 
Military 
Expenditure Troops Parameter 
State sq. kms. 
Population 
US$bill ppp. US$mil. Thousands 
Angola 1,246,700 12,799,293 114.600 2,264 107 
Botswana 600,370 1,990,876 29.170 317 9 
DR Congo 2,345,410 68,692,542 21.080 166 151 
Lesotho 30,355 2,130,819 3.384 40 2 
Madagascar 587,040 20,653,556 21.620 82 14 
Malawi 118,480 14,268,711 11.820 42 5 
Mauritius 2,040 1,284,264 15.750 27 0 
Mozambique 801,590 21,669,278 19.680 57 11 
Namibia 825,418 2,108,665 11.590 239 9 
South Africa 1,219,912 49,052,489 505.100 3,753 62 
Swaziland 17,363 1,123,913 5.708 na na 
Tanzania 945,087 41,048,532 56.220 162 27 
Zambia 752,614 11,862,740 17.830 247 15 
Zimbabwe 390,580 11,392,629 2.292 na 29 
Total 9,882,959 260,078,307 835.844 7,396 441 
South African Share 12% 19% 60% 51% 14% 
 
History and Structure 
The fall of the apartheid regime largely coincided with the end of the Cold War, which had 
affected the sub-region more than most others (Berridge 1990). Hence, Southern Africa was 
transformed from a ‘conflict system’ into at least a nascent ‘security community,’ between the 
members of which war was rapidly becoming inconceivable (Ngoma 2003; Cawthra 1997). 
This would seem to offer almost ideal conditions for the creation of a strong sub-regional 
organisation, but the actual achievements have been somewhat disappointing. 
 
 SADC came into being in 1992 though a merger of two other sub-regional organisations, 
both of which were created as counterweights to apartheid South Africa (Omari and 
Macaringue 2007),  the so-called Frontline States and the Southern African Development Co-
ordination Conference (Ngoma 2005: 79-93).  In 1994, South Africa was welcomed as a 
member of SADC followed by Mauritius in 1995, the DRC and the Seychelles in 1998 and 
Madagascar in 2005 – of which the Seychelles left the organisation from 2004 to 2008, and 
Madagascar’s membership has been suspended.     
 
The founding Treaty of the SADC in 1992 stated several rather unrealistic objectives, such as 
promoting interdependence and integration, as well as basic principles such as sovereign 
equality of member states, solidarity, peace, human rights and democracy. It also described 
the organisational structure of the organisation with a summit of heads of state and 
government at the pinnacle, where decisions would be taken by consensus ‘unless otherwise 
provided’, the quorum being two-thirds of the member states (SADC 1992) (Figure 2). When 
the treaty was amended in 2001, the main innovations were the introduction of a ‘troika’ 
institution under which the incumbent chair would be assisted by both his predecessor and his 
successor, and constitutional provisions for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security 
Cooperation (OPDS). It was further decided that all member states should establish ‘SADC 
national committees’, including representatives of civil society, albeit merely with a 
consultative role (SADC 2001a; Isaksen and Tjønneland 2001).  
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The most important institution for the purposes of this paper is undoubtedly the OPDS, 
usually referred to as ‘the Organ’. It was established in 1996, but was initially not 
subordinated to the ordinary SADC structures, partly because its first chairman, Zimbabwean 
president Mugabe, obstinately clung to the office until 2001 even though the chair was 
supposed to have rotated on an annual basis (Osei-Heide 2002; Nathan 2000). The Organ was 
based on a commitment to ‘peaceful settlement of disputes’ and tasked with developing a 
common foreign policy, joint lobbying in international fora, regional security and defence, 
conflict-prevention management and resolution, mediation and preventive diplomacy by 
means of an early warming system, peace-keeping,  collective security and collective defence 
(Cilliers 1999: 37-45; Berman and Sams 2000: 160-161, 166-167).  
 
Figure 2: SADC Organisational Structure (simplified) 
Source: Based on www.issafrica.org/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/sadc/organogram.pdf 
 
 
ISDSC: INTER-STATE DEFENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE; ISPDC: INTER-STATE POLITICS 
AND DIPLOMACY COMMITTEE; OPDS: ORGAN FOR POLITICS, DEFENCE AND SECURITY 
COOPERATION; PD&S: POLITICS, DEFENCE AND SECURITY; PSC: PUBLIC SECURITY 
COMMITTEE 
 
In 2001, the Organ was finally subsumed directly under the SADC, and comprises the 
ministers of foreign affairs, defence and public or state security. Like the SADC summit, it is 
headed by a troika, the chairman being elected by the summit from its own ranks and on a 
rotational basis, yet with the stipulation that no state can hold both chairmanships 
simultaneously. It has two subordinate bodies: the Inter-State Defence and Security 
Committee (ISDSC), comprising the ministers of defence and of state or public security; and 
the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC), consisting of the ministers of 
foreign affairs. The former has a fairly elaborate structure, incorporating, for instance, a 
Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-ordination Committee (SARPCCO) (Meyns 
2002). 
 
Whether SADC has been a success in the peace and security field is debatable. Even though 
there have been very few armed conflicts between member states, this cannot automatically 
be attributed to SADC, as there have simply been few issues worth going to war over. When 
Namibia and Botswana were on the verge of  an armed confrontation over the disputed 
riverine island of Kasikili, Robert Mugabe, in his capacity as chair of the Organ, sought to 
Summit 
Troika OPDS 
Council of Ministers Troika 
Comm. of Ministers 
ISPDC 
Secretariat 
ISDSC 
State Security Comm. 
Defence Committee 
PSC 
Dep. for PD&S 
Politics & Diplomacy 
Defence & Security 
Tribunal 
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mediate, but had to refer the matter to arbitration by the International Court of Justice (Ngoma 
2005: 155-156).    
 
Both the Organ and SADC are stern defenders of state sovereignty, which has precluded the 
handling of crises between member states. The three main challenges have surely been the 
civil wars in Angola and the DRC and the evolving crisis in Zimbabwe. SADC played 
virtually no role in the Angolan war, but three member states did intervene in the civil war in 
the Congo, just as South Africa played a major diplomatic role in brokering a political 
solution to the conflict by hosting the inter-Congolese dialogue and subsequently by 
contributing peacekeepers, but significantly not under the auspices of SADC (ICG 2001).  
Throughout the crisis in Zimbabwe, SADC has attempted some mediation – mainly through 
South African ‘quiet diplomacy’ – but it has refrained from anything more ‘muscular’. Not 
without justification, it has thus been perceived as aiding and abetting the regime (ICG 2007).   
 
Collective Defence and the Interventions in the DRC and Lesotho 
SADC is officially committed to function as a collective defence organisation, and in 2003 a 
Mutual Defence Pact was signed (SADC 2003), committing members to (unspecified) mutual 
assistance against attack. However, even before this pact was signed, SADC had arguably 
undertaken two collective defence missions: 
• In response to the joint Rwandan and Ugandan military intervention in the 
DRC in 1998, when Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia sent forces to protect the 
besieged regime of Laurent Kabila, which might be seen as collective defence 
in the sense of the UN Charter’s article 51.Even though the mission had 
received no formal SADC mandate, it was subsequently granted ex post facto 
endorsement. 
• In 1998, South Africa and Botswana launched an intervention in Lesotho, 
officially in order to prevent a military coup, which likewise received an 
SADC mandate of sorts after the fact, even though the mission failed in most 
respects (Likoti 2007). 
As far as genuinely multilateral military activities are concerned, the Pact envisions 
collaboration in military training and joint exercises. Some joint  training in peacekeeping 
activities has taken place –, for example at the (now effectively defunct) Regional 
Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) in Harare (De Koenig 2004) – and a couple of military 
exercises have been conducted, including the ‘Blue Hungwe,’ ‘Blue Crane’ and ‘Blue Angel’ 
(Berman and Sams 2000: 169-172; Ngoma 2005: 203). No actual joint deployments have, 
however, taken place, and this seems to presuppose the participation and leadership of South 
Africa. Unfortunately, however, it is almost equally unlikely that the regional giant will be 
willing to play such a role or that this would be accepted by the rest (Barber 2004: 182-195). 
 
For the foreseeable future SADC’s contribution to regional security will thus probably be in 
the field of ‘soft’ measures. It has, for instance, taken some steps to address the serious 
problem of small arms proliferation in the region (e.g. with a ‘Protocol on the Control of 
Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials’) and some weapons have actually been 
collected and subsequently destroyed (SADC 2001b). It is also conceivable that SADC may 
play a role in protecting democracy, thereby helping prevent conflict. In sharp contrast to its 
handling of the Zimbabwe crisis, SADC showed some ‘muscle’ when Madagascar’s president 
was forcefully removed in a coup in March 2009 (IRIN News, March 16, 2009; March 25, 
2009), not only refusing recognition to the usurpers, but also suspending the country from all 
SADC institutions (SADC 2009). 
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Prospects for the Future 
It is hard to be optimistic about SADC’s future. The main problem may be that there is much 
less to the common values often referred to than meets the eye (Nathan 2006; Hammerstad 
2005), with South Africa standing (so far, at least) for values such as democracy and human 
rights that are not really shared by countries such as Zimbabwe, Angola or the DRC – to say 
nothing of a country such as Swaziland that does not even pretend to be committed to them 
(Hodges 2002; ICG 2005, 2006).   
 
Moreover, some member states may not really belong in this REC as their security concerns 
lie elsewhere. One may, for instance, make quite a convincing argument to the effect that 
Tanzania belongs to Eastern Africa and the DRC to the Great Lakes Region or Central Africa, 
which may in fact also be the case with Angola. Hence, the SADC might be better off ridding 
itself of states belonging elsewhere, but institutionalisation is notoriously ‘sticky’ in the sense 
that international organisations only rarely expel member states, just as states rarely leave 
organisations, preferring to ‘hedge their bets’ and remain members whilst limiting their actual 
commitment. 
 
Eastern Africa: IGAD  
The IGAD suffers from the same mismatch between membership and security concerns as 
does the SADC. What further limits its potential is the absence of foundations for hegemony 
(Table 4), showing that the most obvious candidate for such a role, Ethiopia, is much weaker 
in relative terms than Nigeria and South Africa in their respective sub-regions (Iyob 1993). 
Far from being unipolar, the IGAD sub-region is tripolar: Ethiopia, Sudan and Kenya each 
prominent in different dimensions of power and none of them strong enough for domination.      
 
Moreover, virtually all IGAD member states are weak states, and Somalia is a textbook 
example of a failed state. Most member states are also experiencing armed conflicts, quite a 
few of which ‘spill over’ into neighbouring countries – usually other IGAD-member states. 
This problem is exacerbated by the unfortunate propensity of states in the region for ‘proxy 
wars’ against each other, most recently Sudan versus Uganda and Ethiopia versus Eritrea 
(Prunier 2004; Abbink 2003). Finally, the sub-region has been host to Africa’s only two ‘real’ 
international wars: the Ethiopia-Somalia war of 1978 and the Ethiopia-Eritrea war from 1998 
to 2000 (Gorman 1981; Negash and Tronvoll 2000).  
 
Table 4: The Basis of Hegemony in IGAD 
Source: CIA 2008; IISS 2009: 451-452. 
 
Territory GDP 
Military 
Expenditure Troops 
Parameter 
State 
Sq. kms. 
Population 
US$bill ppp. US$mil. Thousands 
Djibouti 23,000 516,055 1.930 17 10 
Eritrea 121,320 5,647,168 3.965 na 202 
Ethiopia 1,127,127 85,237,338 63.440 336 138 
Kenya 582,650 39,002,772 66.480 681 24 
Somalia 637,657 9,832,017 5.756 na 2 
Sudan 2,505,810 41,087,825 88.950 na 109 
Uganda 236,040 32,369,558 34.230 232 45 
Total 5,233,604 213,692,733 264.751 1,266 530 
Ethiopia Share 22% 40% 24% 27% 26% 
Kenya Share 11% 18% 25% 54% 5% 
Sudan Share 48% 19% 34% na 21% 
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History and Structure 
IGAD was founded in 1996 on the basis of the IGADD (Inter-Governmental Authority on 
Drought and Development), which had been launched in 1986 (Berman and Sams 2000: 207-
210; Juma 2003; Terlinden n.d.). Its membership has remained quite stable ever since, 
comprising Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Somalia and Sudan. Eritrea joined following 
its independence from Ethiopia in 1993, but unilaterally suspended its membership in 2007 
(Ethopian Herald, April 27, 2007).  
 
Figure 3: IGAD Organisational Structure (simplified) 
Source: Based on ‘Operational Structure of IGAD’ at www.igad.org/about/op.html, ‘Profile: Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD’ at www.issafrica.org/AF/RegOrg/ unity_to_union/pdfs/igad/organogram.pdf 
and the organigram of IGAD-CEWARN at www.issafrica.org/AF/RegOrg/ unity_to_union/pdfs/igad/cewarn.pdf 
 
 
 
ASSEMBLY: ASSEMBLY OF HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT; CEWARN: CONFLICT EARLY 
WARNING AND RESPONSE MECHANISM; CEWERU: CONFLICT EARLY WARNING AND EARLY 
RESPONSE UNIT; CPMR: CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION; CSO: CIVIL 
SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS; ICPAT: IGAD CAPACITY BUILDING PROGRAMME AGAINST 
TERRORISM; PM: PROGRAMME MANAGER; TCEW: TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON EARLY 
WARNING 
 
The central organs of the organisation are the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, 
the Council of Ministers, the Committee of Ambassadors and the Secretariat, which is located 
in Djibouti and headed by an Executive Secretary (see Figure 3). As with the other RECs, 
IGAD is based on the principle of sovereign equality of member states and the need for 
consensus, albeit with the (rather hypothetical) option of taking decisions through two-thirds 
majority in the Council of Ministers.   
 
IGAD’s main objectives were initially economic, but the IGAD Agreement also highlighted 
the goals to ‘promote peace and stability in the sub-region and create mechanisms within the 
sub-region for the prevention, management and resolution of inter- and intra-state conflicts 
through dialogue’ and to ‘facilitate repatriation and reintegration of refugees, returnees and 
displaced persons and demobilized soldiers’. The agreement also obliged member states to 
deal with disputes ‘within this sub-regional mechanism before they are referred to other 
regional or international organisations’ (IGAD 1986).  
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Division of Peace 
and Security
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PM Humanitarian 
Affairs 
PM 
Political Affairs
Inter-Parliamentary 
Union
CSO Forum 
CEWARN Unit 
CEWERU TCEW 
ICPAT 
 13
In 2003, an ‘IGAD Strategy’ was adopted, mainly as a guideline for the work of the 
Secretariat, enumerating a broad panoply of missions such as promoting good governance and 
human rights (IGAD 2003). This may partly reflect the important role played by the donors, 
on whose support the running of the organisation to a large extent depends and who are 
organised in an IGAD Partners Forum (IGAD 2002).  
 
The same may be the case with one of the recent initiatives, the IGAD Capacity Building 
Program Against Terrorism (ICPAT) (Juma 2007). Even though the incidence of terrorism 
was, at least until the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in December 2006, quite low (Møller 
2006: 39-44), the United States regards the region as a ‘hotspot’ of international terrorism. 
Hence quite generous funds are available for whatever is ostensibly devoted to counter-
terrorism, allowing states to tap into a rich resource pool for financing their security sectors 
simply by claiming that the purpose is counter-terrorism. 
 
Peace Efforts in Sudan and Somalia  
IGAD’s efforts at conflict resolution have focused on Sudan and Somalia (Woodward 2004). 
It thus played quite a central role in the peace process between the government of Sudan and 
the SPLA/M (Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement) (Adar 2000), establishing a 
permanent secretariat, appointing special envoys and hosting negotiations between the two 
sides. The first main achievement was the 2002 Machakos Protocol, setting out the contours 
of a settlement featuring power sharing between the North and South, extensive autonomy for 
the latter followed by a referendum on secession after a six-year transitional period. Then 
came protracted negotiations on the details, producing a series of protocols that were then 
wrapped up in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 (Thomas 2009). While 
this was certainly an achievement, IGAD has neither been involved in the implementation of 
the CPA, nor done much about the civil war in Darfur, leaving this to the AU.  
 
Even though IGAD had not been involved in the negotiations that in 2000 produced a 
Transitional National Government (TNG) for Somalia it did, somewhat reluctantly, grant 
some recognition to the TNG (Anonymous 2002; Bryden 2003). In 2002, it provided the 
auspices for a new set of negotiations, producing an agreement on a federalist political 
dispensation, followed in 2004 by the establishment (on the basis of clan-quotas) of a 
transitional federal parliament and government (TFP and TFG) (ICG 2004a, 2004b). Having 
thus served as ‘midwife’ it is hardly surprising that IGAD remained unswervingly on the side 
of this so-called ‘government’, even though it lacked democratic legitimacy (as none of the 
delegates had ever been elected) and showed no capacity to govern the country (Møller 
2008b, 2009b). IGAD effectively condoned the Ethiopian invasion in support of the TFG in 
late 2006, followed by two years of de facto occupation, producing one of Africa’s most 
severe humanitarian emergencies (Menkhaus 2007), and  left it to the AU to send a 
peacekeeping force, AMISOM, ostensibly intended to allow for an Ethiopian withdrawal. 
 
Conflict Prevention and Military Activities 
In 1998, IGAD embarked on the implementation of a five-point programme on conflict 
prevention, resolution and management. In 2002, an elaborate protocol was adopted on the 
‘Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism for IGAD Member States’ (CEWARN), 
and in 2003 a CEWARN unit was actually opened in Addis Ababa (Mwaüra and Schmeidl 
2002).  
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CEWARN is very ambitiously intended for both early warning and response, but seems to 
entail little more than an exchange of information. In addition to the central mechanism, the 
intention is to establish national conflict early warning and response units (CEWERU), and to 
liaise with NGOs and civil society organisations involved in the gathering of information. By 
early 2009, three ‘clusters’ were operational, all devoted to localised and mainly pastoral 
conflicts, labelled the Afar-Issa, Karamoja and Somalia clusters, the latter focusing 
exclusively on the border regions of Kenya. 
 
While this may count as a partial success, the organisation’s efforts at fielding one of the five 
sub-regional brigades for the AU must be categorised as a complete failure. IGAD initially 
showed considerable commitment to fielding an Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) 
and held numerous meetings on the topic, but eventually it was decided to establish 
EASBRIG outside the framework of IGAD (Mulugeta 2008).  
 
Conclusion 
The IGAD thus seems to be considerably weaker than ECOWAS and even the SADC, having 
neither a balance of power nor ‘ties of amity and enmity’ conducive to the creation of a 
functioning sub-regional organisation. The main achievement is surely the Sudanese peace, 
but it seems very doubtful whether this will hold. Neither with regard to international wars 
such as that between Ethiopia and Eritrea, nor state collapse and civil war such as that of 
Somalia, has the IGAD been able to make much of a difference. In fact, in the latter case it 
may well have inadvertently exacerbated the situation, both by bringing into existence the 
TFG and by effectively rubber-stamping the Ethiopian invasion. The organisation has also 
been completely passive with regard to the conflicts in Uganda (pitting the government 
against the Lord’s Resistance Army), the conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan, the several 
conflicts in Ethiopia and the recent disturbances in the otherwise quite stable Kenya. There 
seems to be no reason to expect this to change in the foreseeable future and thus few grounds 
for even cautious optimism. 
 
Central Africa: ECCAS 
The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) was established in 1983 on the 
basis of two smaller economic organisations. The members are Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, 
the Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of Congo, the DRC, Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon and Sao Tomé and Principe (Berman and Sams 2000: 201-206). 
 
As is apparent from Table 5, there is very little basis for hegemony within ECCAS, although 
there are two obvious candidates – Angola and the DRC – one of which is economically 
dominant (albeit not quite enough for it to really matter) whereas the other is economically 
weak, but strong in terms of population and troops. Moreover, both these countries have only 
recently come out of protracted and quite nasty civil wars, as have other members such as 
Burundi. State weakness is thus a prevalent feature of most member states, which bodes ill for 
the organisation. The protracted and extremely destructive war in the DRC was especially 
damaging as it pitted two members, Angola and Rwanda (which has since left the 
organisation), against each other on the territory of a third (Chouala 2008). 
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Table 5: The Basis of Hegemony in ECCAS 
Source: CIA 2008; IISS 2009:,451-452. 
 
Territory GDP MILEX Troops Parameter
State sq. kms. 
Population 
US$bill ppp. US$mil. Thousands 
Angola 1,246,700 12,799,293 114.600 2264 107 
Burundi 27,830 8,988,091 3.215 78 20 
Cameroon 475,440 18,879,301 44.030 297 14 
CAR 622,984 4,511,488 3.262 18 3 
DR Congo 2,345,410 68,692,542 21.080 166 151 
Eq. Guinea 28,051 633,441 18.620 8 1 
Gabon 267,667 1,514,993 22.160 123 5 
Rep. Congo 342,000 4,012,809 14.790 94 10 
Sao T./P 1,001 212,679 0.278 na na 
Total 5,357,083 120,244,637 242.035 3,048 311 
Angola’s Share 23% 11% 47% 74% 34% 
DRC’s Share 44% 57% 9% 5% 49% 
Legend: CAR: Central African Republic; DR: Democratic Republic; GDP: Gross Domestic 
Product; MILEX: Military Expenditure; ppp: purchasing power parity; Sao T./P.: Sao Tomé 
and Principe; sq. kms: square kilometres 
 
Nor does it help that several members have divided loyalties, also belonging to other RECs, 
such as the SADC, to which both Angola and the DRC belong. Another challenge may be the 
Central African Economic and Monetary Community (Awoumou 2008). Although not a 
designated REC, in 2002 it fielded a peacekeeping mission, FOMUC (Force multinationale 
en Centrafrique) to the Central African Republic with the official endorsement of the UN 
Security Council and lasting until 2008. FOMUC’s size was quite limited, with around three- 
to four-hundred troops being provided by three member states, the Republic of Congo, Chad 
and Gabon (Zwanenburg 2006; Alusala 2007: 9-27); and in 2008 it was transformed into a 
Mission for the Consolidation of Peace (MICOPAX), now under the auspices of ECCAS and 
with the additional participation of Angola and Cameroon and a total size of 640 personnel 
(Opérations de Paix 2008). 
 
In its founding treaty ECCAS was mainly intended to create a customs union, but the 
organisation was given a rather elaborate organisational structure, the main bodies being a 
Conference of Heads of State and Government, a Council of Ministers, a Court of Justice, a 
General Secretariat and a Consultative Commission, in addition to which the establishment of 
a number of technical committees was envisioned (see Figure 4) (ECCAS 1983). However, 
ECCAS was almost completely dormant until 1999, when efforts were undertaken to 
revitalise it. 
 
In 2000, ECCAS adopted a ‘Mutual Assistance Pact’ (Mubiala 2003: 7-14), committing 
member states to come to each other’s assistance in the case of aggression and to prepare for 
this through joint military manoeuvres. Furthermore, in 2000 a protocol was adopted on a 
‘Peace and Security Council for Central Africa’ (COPAX), underlining sovereignty and non-
interference in internal affairs as guiding principles, but also mentioning confidence-building 
measures and common approaches to such problems as refugees and internally displaced 
persons as well as transnational crime and arms trafficking (ECCAS 2000). Out of this have 
sprung decisions in 2002 to establish a Defence and Security Commission (DSC), a Central 
African Multinational Force (FOMAC) and an early warning mechanism (MARAC) (ECCAS 
2002a). FOMAC is described as consisting of  ‘interservice, police, gendarmerie contingents 
and of civilian modules’ with the size of up to three brigades with appropriate naval and air 
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support and tasked with missions such as observation and cease-fire monitoring, preventative 
deployment, peacekeeping, enforcement of sanctions and even humanitarian interventions, on 
behalf of ECCAS, the AU and the UN (ECCAS 2002b). MARAC is supposed to be 
responsible for data collection and analysis about impending crises and conflicts, to be 
gathered by national bureaus and collated in a central data base (ECCAS 2002c).  
 
Figure 4: Structure of ECCAS (simplified) 
 
REGULAR STRUCTURE COPAX STRUCTURE 
 
 
COPAX: CONSEIL DE PAIS ET DE SÉCURITÉ DE L’AFRIQUE CENTRALE (PEACE AND SECURITY 
COUNCIL FOR CENTRAL AFRICA); CDS: COMMISSION DE DÉFENSE ET SÉCURITÉ (DEFENCE AND 
SECURITY COMMISSION); FOMAC: FORCE MULTINATIONALE D’AFRIQUE CENTRALE (CENTRAL 
AFRICAN MULTINATIONAL FORCE); IHPSS: INTÉGRATION HUMAINE, PAIX, SÉCURITÉ ET STABILITÉ; 
MARAC: MÉCANISME D’ALERTE RAPIDE DE L’AFRIQUE CENTRALE (CENTRAL AFRICAN EARLY 
WARNING MECHANISM); MICOPAX: MISSION POUR LA CONSOLIDATION DU PAIX (MISSION FOR 
THE CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE) 
 
It remains to be seen whether anything tangible will come out of these decisions, and by mid-
2009 there were still no signs of this, leaving ECCAS as an even weaker REC than the IGAD.  
 
North Africa: The AMU 
The weakest of all the designated RECs is surely the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), 
dominated as it is by the two sub-regional powers of approximately equal strength, Algeria 
and Morocco (Table 6). As these two countries are each other’s arch-enemies, it is small 
wonder that AMU is extremely weak, bordering on complete insignificance. The only 
hypothetical development that might change this would be an accession to the organisation by 
Egypt, which would appear a natural hegemon, but there are no indications that this will ever 
happen. The government in Cairo did apply for, but was refused, membership in 1994 (Coshy 
1995).  
The AMU was founded in 1989 and comprises Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and 
Mauritania (Aghrout and Sutton 1990; Berman and Sams 2000: 193-197; Mortimer 1999; 
Brunel 2008). Even though its founding treaty mentions the objective of  ‘contributing to the 
preservation of the peace based on justice and equity’ (AMU 1989), it has never made any 
contribution to this, and the organigram in Figure 4 also exhibits no institutional signs of any 
such ambition. 
Conf. of Heads of  
State/Gov. 
Council of Ministers 
Court of Justice 
(Not yet operational) 
Consultative Commission 
Secretariat 
 
Technical Commissions 
Conf. of Heads of State/Gov. 
Council of Ministers  
Secretariat 
CDS 
MARAC 
FOMAC 
MICOPAX 
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Table 6: The Basis of Hegemony in AMU 
Source: CIA 2008; IISS 2009: 451-452 
 
Territory GDP 
Military 
Expenditure Troops 
Parameter
State 
sq.kms. 
Population 
US$bill ppp. US$mil. Thousands 
Algeria 2,381,740 34,178,188 240.200        4,270            147 
Libya 1,759,540 6,310,430 92.010           656              76 
Mauritania 1,030,700 3,129,486 64.920             19              16 
Morocco 446,550 34,859,364 137.400        2,409            196 
Tunesia 163,610 10,486,339 83.400           470              36 
Total 5,782,140 88,963,807 617.930        7,824            471 
Algeria Share 41% 38% 39% 55% 31% 
Moroccan Share 8% 39% 22% 31% 42% 
 
Figure 4: Structure of the AMU 
Source: Based on ‘Profile: Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)/Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA)’ at 
www.issafrica.org/ 
 
 
 
The organisation has been almost moribund ever since its creation, and has not met at the 
summit level since 1994. A decision was taken in 1999 to relaunch the AMU (Africa 
Research 1999), but very little came out of this. The main reason for this is probably the 
never-ending dispute between Algeria and Morocco over Western Sahara (Sahrawi) (Zoubir 
1990; Zunes 1995). 
 
Conclusion: Seamless Web or Patchwork? 
However good they may look on paper, the AU’s plans for an African security architecture 
based on the RECs are thus fraught with problems. Existing RECs do not constitute a 
‘seamless web’ of sub-regional security organisations covering the entire continent but, at 
best, a patchwork with several gaping holes. While ECOWAS has a proven capacity to deal 
with conflicts with its sub-region, except those in Nigeria, neither SADC nor IGAD has the 
same capacity, and both ECCAS and the AMU have practically none.    
 
Besides the all-pervasive shortage of resources, in turn a reflection of poverty and low state 
capacity, the explanation may be that several states are misplaced in the sense that their most 
urgent security concerns are not addressed by the REC to which they belong. Ideally, the 
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Ministers 
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‘who goes where’ question should be approached from scratch by disbanding existing RECs 
and creating new ones, corresponding to actual security concerns, but this is almost certainly 
not going to happen, and the best one can hope for is a piecemeal transformation where 
individual countries gradually switch allegiances.     
 
Another problem – likewise related to resource scarcity – is the lack in AMU, ECCAS and 
IGAD of powers able and willing to play the role of hegemons with leading roles, but also 
with responsibilities to provide some of the resources that the rest lack, to which should be 
added (for the sake of acceptability) a certain humility and a preparedness to do things 
multilaterally and in conformity with common rules that the state in question would actually 
be capable of doing unilaterally. So far, Nigeria and South Africa have come close – but 
perhaps not quite close enough – to this ideal in their respective sub-regions, but in the three 
other REC even the material foundations of hegemony are missing. 
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Appendix 1: Africa, Sub-regions and International Organisations 
 
 
Reg. Sub-regional (REC) Others                     
 
Sub-Region 
           Members 
 
 
 
Organisation A
U
 
A
M
U
 
E
C
O
W
A
S 
IG
A
D
 
SA
D
C
 
E
C
C
A
S 
C
O
M
E
SA
 
C
E
N
-S
A
D
 
E
A
C
 
L
A
S 
Algeria ? ? - - - - - - - ? 
Egypt ? - - - - - ? ? - ? 
Libya ? ? - - - - ? ? - ? 
Mauritania ? ? - - - - - ? - ? 
Morocco - ? - - - - - ? - ? 
Sahrawi ? - - - - - - - - - 
North Africa 
Tunisia ? ? - - - - - ? - ? 
Benin ? - ? - - - - ? - - 
Burkina Faso ? - ? - - - - ? - - 
Cape Verde ? - ? - - - - - - - 
Cote d'Ivoire ? - ? - - - - ? - - 
Gambia ? - ? - - - - ? - - 
Ghana ? - ? - - - - ? - - 
Guinea ? - ? - - - - ? - - 
Guinea-Bissau ? - ? - - - - ? - - 
Liberia ? - ? - - - - ? - - 
Mali ? - ? - - - - ? - - 
Niger ? - ? - - - - ? - - 
Nigeria ? - ? - - - - ? - - 
Senegal ? - ? - - - - ? - - 
Sierra Leone ? - ? - - - - ? - - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
West Africa 
Togo ? - ? - - - - ? - -- 
Comoros ? - - - - - ? ? - ? 
Djibouti ? - - ? - - ? ? - ? 
Eritrea ? - - ?* - - ? ? - O 
Ethiopia ? - - ? - - ? - - - 
Kenya ? - - ? - - ? ? ? - 
Madagascar ? - - - ? - ? - - - 
Mauritius ? - - - ? - ? - - - 
Rwanda ? - - - - - ? - ? - 
Seychelles ? - - - - - ? - - - 
Somalia ? - - ? - - - ? - ? 
Sudan ? - - ? - - ? ? - ? 
Tanzania ? - - - ? - - - ? - 
Eastern 
Africa 
Uganda ? - - ? - - ? - ? - 
Angola ? - - - ? ? - - - - 
Botswana ? - - - ? - - - - - 
Lesotho ? - - - ? - - - - - 
Malawi ? - - - ? - ? - - - 
Mozambique ? - - - ? - - - - - 
Namibia ? - - - ? - - - - - 
South Africa ? - - - ? - - - - - 
Swaziland ? - - - ? - ? - - - 
Zambia ? - - - ? - ? - - - 
Southern 
Africa 
Zimbabwe ? - - - ? - ? - - - 
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Burundi ? - - - - ? ? - ? - 
Cameroon ? - - - - ? - - - - 
Central African  Rep.  ? - - - - ? - ? - - 
Chad ? - - - - ? - ? - - 
DR of Congo ? - - - ? ? ? - - - 
Equatorial Guinea ? - - - - ? - - - - 
Gabon ? - - - - ? - - - - 
Rep. of the Congo ? - - - - ? - - - - 
Central Africa 
Sao Tomé & Principe ? - - - - ? - ? - - 
Africa Total Membership 53 5 15 7* 14 10 19 28 5 10† 
Notes: AMU: Arab Maghreb Union; AU: African Union, CEN-SAD: Community of Sahel-Saharan States; COME-
SA: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa; EAC: East African Community; ECCAS: Economic Commu-
nity of Central African States; ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States; IGAD: Inter-Governmental 
Authority on Development; LAS: League of Arab States; O: Observer; SADC: Southern African Development 
Community; * Eritrea suspended its membership in 2007; † The total membership of the LAS is 21 plus 3 observers, 
including Eritrea 
 
Source: Institute for Security Studies: ‘Profile: African Union (AU),’ at www.issafrica.org/ 
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Appendix 2: The African Union and the Regional Economic Communities 
 
AU AMU ECOWAS 
 
 
 
IGAD ECCAS SADC 
 
 
 
EAC COMESA CEN-SAD 
 
 
 
NOTE: THE SMALL ISLAND STATES (COMOROS, CAPE VERDE, MAURITIUS, 
THE SEYCHELLES AND SAO TOMÉ AND PRINCIPE) HAVE NOT BEEN 
INCLUDED. LIGHT BLUE INDICATES EITHER THAT THE COUNTRY’S STATUS 
IS DISPUTED (SAHRAWI) OR THAT MEMBERSHIP HAS BEEN SUSPENDED 
(ERITREA).  
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